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Deregulation: How Far Should It Go?
GEORGE W. WILSON*
All business enterprises are regulated to a greater or lesser extent
in the sense that they are subject to constraints of varying kinds that
either induce or compel actions which would not otherwise be taken
or which would not be taken to the same extent. Such a general level
of abstraction, however, is not amenable to meaningful interpretation
and analysis. I will therefore confine my remarks to those sets of
privately owned and operated enterprises that are subject to economic
regulation by commission.
Our broad topic of discussion assumes that there is need for a
theory as to when and to what extent deregulation should be carried
out. A second component of the question involves the distinction-if
such exists-between theories of regulation and theories of deregulation.
I turn to the first question in the first section of this paper.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEORY OF REGULATION
There exists at the moment no sensible theory of regulation at all,
if by a theory is meant a nontautological, rational explanation of exist-
ing phenomena, even if we confine ourselves to the issue of commission-
type regulation. In a predominantly free enterprise or market economy,
we usually study commission regulation, regulation by a special agency
of a group of privately owned and operated firms. The agency or com-
mission is usually granted broad powers over specific aspects of the
firms so regulated (such as prices, price structure, accounting pro-
cedures, mergers, entry, financial arrangements, and so on). Thus, I
mean by regulation (and deregulation) powers conferred upon (or
taken away from) separately identifiable commissions or agencies with
detailed powers to prescribe business practices for a particular set of
privately owned and operated firms. Given this conception, a theory
explaining when and why particular firms have been subjected to this
form of economic regulation rather than left to the general regulation
*B. Comm. 1950, Carleton University; M.A. 1951, University of Kentucky; Ph.D. 1955
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of the antitrust laws and competitive forces is either an incredibly com-
plicated exercise or necessarily becomes tautological. It is a complicated
and possibly meaningless exercise because:
(a) From American experience a wide variety of industries in
terms of structure, performance, and other variables have in fact been
regulated by commissions-from trucking to electric power and tele-
phones. Thus, there has been no common economic denominator under-
lying commission-type regulation and ever since Nebbia such common-
ality is no longer legally relevant.
(b) Some commission regulated industries have sought economic
regulation while others have not. There is much ambiguity on this
point. Many now believe that the railroads, for example, because of the
periodic breakdown of their privately-operated cartels, actively sought
the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The traditional
view, on the contrary, holds that regulation was thrust upon the rail-
roads as a punishment for abuses of economic power. There is indeed a
great variation in the extent to which particular industries now regulated
by commission actively sought or fought it. A theory of regulation would
need to sort out the historical evidence to determine which is the correct
interpretation-no easy task in itself. For instance, in the trucking in-
dustry we are advised that regulation was favored by the larger trucking
enterprises as well as the railroads and the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission itself, but for the industry as a whole the picture is unclear. Thus,
there appears in general to be a wide variation among presently regulated
industries in terms of the original sources of and incentives toward .regu-
lation and the extent to which the now regulated firms sought to mold
thelegislation and its subsequent interpretation and enforcement.
(c) Commission regulated industries were subjected to controls
at different times, when different overall economic conditions prevailed
-the railroads in 1887, electricity and gas in 1905, telephone and tele-
graph in 1910, trucks and airlines in the mid-1930's, and so on. And,
since the overall political conditions and varying legal interpretations,
as well as economic conditions, had a great deal to do with both the inci-
dence of regulation and its nature, it is clear that these factors would
have to. be considered as variables in any theory purporting to explain
commission-type regulation. The 1930's, for example, was a period in
which society began to question the efficacy of competition as a regulator
of business. There was a strong push for "codes of fair competition"
under the NRA. In such a milieu, it was easier to justify economic regu-
lation of even competitive industries such as trucking. Similar moods
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tend not to have prevailed in earlier or subsequent eras throughout the
nation as a whole.
(d) Some commission regulated industries were to be restricted
in their pricing and other behavior, while others were to be promoted-
for example, the air transport industry. Some of the industries were
directly subsidized, such as the shipping industry, and others were not.
I submit, therefore, given this enormous variety of circumstances
that a theory with a certain amount of predictive or explanatory power
is almost a logical impossibility, and the search for it is probably a
meaningless exercise. If we demand of such a theory assertions to the
effect that Industry B is liable to be subjected to commission-type econ-
omic regulation under a specified set of conditions whereas Industry A
is not, we must very clearly specify the particular conditions. If we are
unable to specify, measure, "weight," and predict these, we will be un-
able to predict when Industry A will in fact be subjected-if at all-to
economic regulation. That is, we need to be able to specify a relationship
along the following lines:
Economic Regulation of Industry A = f (structure, practices, and
performance of A, the state of the industry and the nation, the political
power of industry members, vis-A-vis competitors and customers, the
relative importance of the industry to the economy and national defense,
whether or not Industry B, which provides substitute service, is regu-
lated, and other variables).
Not only are many of these variables nonquantifiable but there is
no known way for some of them (e.g., political power) even to be ranked
between industries. Furthermore, most of the variables change over time
in ways that cannot readily be envisioned. In addition, a weighting
system would be required for each of the variables which would be in-
herently subjective unless, of course, some econometric model could be
devised to specify the coefficients in some reasonable form and fashion.
Finally, we cannot a priori deduce the direction of the relationship for
some of the variables. (Does a high degree of political power of the
firms in an industry increase the likelihood of regulation or does it in-
crease the likelihood of no regulation at all?) Thus, it seems fair to
assert that "continued absence of regulation in some sectors of the econ-
omy is the product of historical and political circumstance rather than
of any principled policy guiding the activities of American government."'
IAltshuler, The Case for Less Transportation Regulation, at 5, March 5, 1975 (paper
delivered at the National Transportation Institute, Chicago).
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A theory of regulation in the above sense becomes tautological to
the extent that it asserts such things as "regulation occurs when the
'demand for regulation' exceeds the 'supply"' or when "entropy" ex-
ceeds the level of "tolerance."'2 These are tautological because we cannot
quantify or even qualitatively rank the variables involved and their
components nor can we test the theories empirically. We take the fact
of regulation to mean that the benefits must have exceeded the costs or
that entropy must have exceeded tolerance which, without being able to
specify the variables involved and their relative weights and ranking,
means that industries are regulated because they are regulated. We can-
not therefore predict in advance when particular industries will or even
may be subjected to any specific form of regulation--commission or
otherwise. This is true even when we confine ourselves to strictly ecoi-
omic variables.
Now we have been advised that there are two general theories of
regulation. As Posner puts it, one theory "holds that regulation is a
device for protecting the public against the adverse effects of monopoly,"
while the other "holds that regulation is procured by politically effective
groups assumed to be composed of the members of the regulated in-
dustry itself, for their own protection." 3 Neither of these views "e:-
plains" much about contemporary economic regulation in the United
States. Neither theory-if indeed either one deserves the appellation
"theory"--is capable of explaining the origins, regulatory patterns, and
practices of the separate regulatory agencies in the United States at
present. To search for such a theory of regulation (or deregulation) is
in my judgment a waste of time, particularly if one requires of it the
type of explanatory power implied by Posner.4
The Need for a Theory of Regulation
If the foregoing is accepted as at least plausible, should we then
lament the low probability of ever developing a meaningful explanation
of the incidence of commission-type regulation of an industry? I think
not. Interesting as it may be to offer a plausible interpretation of past
economic regulation and possibly even to be able to predict when and
where it might occur in the future, the more important aspect of the
issue is to examine the conditions under which such regulation may be
successful, from the public point of view.5 At the same time, a study of
2 Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BEll J. EcoN. & MAlN. Scr. 3 (1971).
3 Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. Ecor. & MAx. Sci. 22 (1971).
4 For example, he complains that neither theory can explain why regulatory commis-
sions encourage "international subsidization." Id. at 30.
5 Criteria of "success" are noted in section II, infra.
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the consequences of past regulation, even if this failed to result in a
theory of regulation, would permit a better assessment of any future or
proposed regulatory schemes for particular industries. The combination
of knowledge regarding conditions for success and the consequences of
past regulatory practices would prove invaluable in analyzing future
regulatory, including deregulatory, proposals. In the next section of this
paper, I turn to an examination of the conditions for success in this
context, to be followed in the third section by an examination of the
consequences of past and present regulation.
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL REGULATION
There are various criteria for "success" which depend, of course,
upon the purpose of, or reasons for, regulation in the first place. A view
of regulation as designed to benefit the regulated firms would have dif-
ferent criteria than would a view which stressed the need to restrain
anticompetitive practices in the public interest. Since the stated purpose
(whether real or not) of virtually all regulatory agencies is to protect
the public in one form or another, even in cases where industrial promo-
tion is part of the rationale, I will assume that public interest criteria
are most relevant. As an economist, let me employ the distinction be-
tween efficiency criteria and social goals. There is no clear-cut distinction
between these, for in the final analysis efficiency and economic growth
are pursued to accomplish many other objectives relating to equality,
.defense, health, safety, fulfillment, and the like. Taking the social goals
as given, we can argue that successful commission regulation implies an
improvement in economic performance, (i.e., a rise in output per unit
of input) compared with what would be expected in the absence of such
regulation, so long as important social goals are not adversely affected
in the process of regulating compared to what would otherwise be
anticipated. Indeed, the latter frequently loom large in regulatory be-
havior even when inconsistent with efficiency. Thus, urban transit fares
are held down, often below cost during peak periods, partly to benefit
the working poor even though they obviously induce a greater amount
of capital devoted to mass transit than would be needed on efficiency
grounds. There is nothing wrong with assistance to the poor, but it is
at least highly questionable whether this is the most effective way to
provide it.
It is worth noting at this point that almost all regulatory commis-
sions have multiple objectives. The ICC, for example, has stated that
in any important case it must "consider the economic effects on all
[Vol. 51:700
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shippers, on towns, cities, ports and regions, on the carriers themselves,
and, of course, on the consumers."' All this in addition to the "needs"
of commerce, defense, and the postal service! Yet the Commission has
never defined its preference function nor specified the relative weights
to be accorded to these often conflicting interests."
As a consequence, the Commission is able to "justify" every deci-
sion regardless of its impact on, say, efficiency in the provision of trans-
port services. Without knowing the relative weights accorded to the
many economic and non-economic criteria, it is not possible to judge
the Commission's performance objectively in terms of its own goals.
Let us for the moment eschew non-economic criteria or assume
these to be best satisfied by policies external to the industry being con-
sidered for regulation, or assume that the pursuit of improved economic
performance in the industry will not jeopardize non-economic objectives.
Stressing economic criteria (i.e., cheapness and plenty or, more formally,
the use of least-cost techniques and factor combinations that produce
any given volume of output), I have argued elsewhere8 that regulation
has a high probability of success when the following conditions exist in
any industry:
(1) External benefits and costs are large. If there is a wide gap
between privately perceived benefits and costs relative to social benefits
and costs, and if these cannot, for a variety of economic and non-economic
reasons, be brought closer to equality through efficient public pricing
(e.g., effluent charges in the case of cars) or taxation (e.g., fuel tax
for use of publicly provided right-of-way), then private unregulated
decision-making will lead to pricing, output, and investment decisions
that are inefficient in the sense of maximizing net social benefits. The
wider the gap between social and private costs and benefits, the greater
the possibility of successful regulation.
(2) The magnitude of costs that are non-assignable to specific
sales units is large. Because of high fixed or joint costs or costs that are
non-assignable on a cost-occasioned basis to particular sales units be-
cause of a difference between the size of a unit of sales and the minimum
feasible unit of output, it is not possible to recover total costs by pricing
6INTERsTATE Co~icrcE ComISsxON, THE REGULATORY IssuEs OF TODAY 2 (1975).
71 once characterized ICC regulation in terms of a "Grand Benthamite Design"
which necessarily fails for the reasons inherent in the failure of Bentham's felicific calculus
as well as partial and incomplete Commission jurisdiction. See Wilson, The Effect of
Rate Regulation on Resource Allocation in Transportation, 54 Am. EcoN. REv. 160
(1964).8 The Logic of Economic Regulation, in Busnnss Loois'ics: Poucr s AND DEcIsIONs,
Ch. 4 (D. McConaugh & C. Clawson eds. 1968).
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the sales units on the basis of the costs occasioned by virtue of producing
any particular unit. This means that price discrimination of some sort,
including an arbitrary allocation of indivisible costs to units of sale, or
subsidy, are the only two ways for a private enterprise to break even.
Depending upon the nature of the product or service provided, a private
firm seeking maximum or even satisfactory profits is liable to dis-
criminate in a fashion inconsistent with other public policy goals. Under
these circumstances a regulated pricing structure can render price dis-
crimination more consistent with other objectives in a fashion that would
not necessarily be more inconsistent with efficiency than a privately estab-
lished price structure. The greater the magnitude of non-assignable costs,
therefore, the greater the possibility of establishing a pricing structure
in the public interest with a lesser adverse potential impact upon effi-
ciency.9
(3) The industry is inherently "monopolistic" due to economics
of scale. This is the traditional justification for imposing price regulation
to protect the public from the higher prices and restricted output that
ensue from attempts to maximize pecuniary profits under monopoly as
compared to competitive conditions.1"
(4) The costs of regulation, including the impact of regulation
on efficiency and technological change within the firm or firms regulated
are not excessive, or perhaps are favorable to, efficiency and technological
change.
Opposite conclusions with respect to the probability of successful
regulation hold to the extent that these conditions do not prevail. In
general, economic regulation is capable of improving economic perform-
ance and/or reducing undesirable side effects from the public viewpoint
where the above conditions exist. If only some of these conditions exist,
as is likely in most cases, the assessment of the probability of "success-
ful" economic regulation becomes more complex as difficult trade-offs
emerge. This does suggest the need for very careful advance appraisal
of industry prior to imposition of regulatory restraints.
9 Indeed, it can be shown that efficient pricing in a multi-product enterprise subject
to a constraint that revenues equal costs or exceed costs by a "fair" or "normal" amount,
requires that individual prices systematically deviate from marginal cost on the basis of
the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand. Baumol & Bradford, Optimal Departures
from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 Am. EcoN. REv. 265 (1970). The alternative when
Pi = MCi is, of course, subsidy. One then needs to compare the benefits of the con-
straint (revenues = costs) with the benefits less the costs of higher taxation due to
subsidy.
10See J.C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); E. CLEia~S,
ECONo1Ics AND PUBLIC UTITIEs (1950).
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It should also be noted that several of these conditions are inter-
related. For example, the ease and hence the cost of regulation is vastly
simplified if only a single firm is involved-though there are troubles
aplenty with Ma Bell. In addition, some portion of the non-assignable
costs and externalities are directly related to factors rendering the market
inherently or "naturally" monopolistic. These conditions are not, how-
ever, necessarily interrelated. Regulatory costs are partly dependent on
the type of regulation imposed. Cost indivisibilities of various kinds exist
in non-monopolistic markets as well. Externalities, as already noted,
depend in part upon the attempts of public authorities to price publicly
provided facilities economically and to recapture or to internalize external
costs. The magnitude of the gap between private and social costs is not
something dictated by the inherent nature of the commodity or produc-
tive process.
Finally, in this connection, one must admit that measurement of
these conditions, or even specifying orders of magnitude, involves sub-
stantial guesswork and in the final analysis, especially as regards the
last condition, must be judgmental. Nevertheless, the possibility of suc-
cessful economic regulation by an independent and objective regulatory
commission is heavily dependent upon these conditions even if the mea-
surement of many of the variables involved is somewhat judgmental.
CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOmiC REGULATION
The most thoroughly (some would say tediously) explored aspect
of economic consequences is a particular form of regulation, namely rate
of return regulation. 1 Such analyses are confined to a single firm mono-
poly producing a homogeneous product and assume "effective" regulation
as well as static and known cost and demand functions. The general re-
suits of such analyses are that (1) compared with unregulated monopoly,
output is higher and prices lower; (2) the firm is encouraged to use
more capital than is efficient; and (3) under plausible conditions, the
suppliers of the regulated monopolist may be induced to conspire and
charge higher prices because the rate of return regulated monopolist
has less incentive to resist high prices for capital equipment.
Subsequent developments of the so-called A-J effect have modified
the original assumptions by introducing such things as regulatory lag,
uncertainty, alternative firm objectives beyond simply profit maximiza-
1 1 The literature on this is virtually endless. The initiating analysis emerged almost
concurrently in Averch & Johnson. The Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am.
EcoN. Ray. 1062 (1962), and Wellisez, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies:
An Economic Analysis, 71 J. PoL. EcoN. 30 (1963).
1976]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tion, and alternative regulatory constraints. Such changes in assumption,
not unnaturally, lead to different conclusions including no tendency to-
ward over-capitalization and even under-capitalization. The various con-
clusions emerging from different combinations of assumptions are fully
specified elsewhere and for present purposes are not particularly ger-
mane.
12
No comparable theoretical exploration has been made of other than
monopoly market structures, nor has the situation regarding dynamics
been very carefully examined. Nor have all the dimensions of commission
regulation under partial jurisdiction been analyzed with any degree of
generality. Indeed, given the variety of industries subjected to commis-
sion regulation, as well as the differential impact of other aspects of
public policy including tariffs, taxes, labor relations, user charges, pub-
lic investments, subsidies, and the like, it is evident that a general theory
applicable to all regulated industries would not be very useful. Further-
more, the various regulatory agencies not only have different regulatory
powers (including the extent of control over firms providing similar
services; e.g., the ICC has 100 percent jurisdiction over railroads, 30
percent over motor carriers, and less than 10 percent over inland water
carriers, the FPC has jurisdiction only over wholesale interstate sales,
the FCC over frequency allocation but not intrastate rates, etc.), but the
actual pattern of regulation differs. Some agencies stress rate of return
regulation, others concentrate on prices, and some use the operating ratio
as a criterion of "fairness"; the relative emphasis on entry and exit con-
trol, mergers, accounting procedures, "systematic" integrity, the structure
of rates, fares and prices, non-efficiency criteria, and so on, differs from
agency to agency. There is thus little alternative but to examine the
economic consequences on an industry by industry (or commission by
commission) basis. While certain comparable results across the regu-
lated industries emerge, the point to stress under present knowledge and
circumstances is the diversity noted above. Indeed, if deregulation is to
occur, it needs to be justified on a case-by-case basis. The rationale for
deregulation of, say, the trucking industry is unlikely to be the same as
that for community antenna television (CATV) not only because 'the
"industries" are different but because the regulation also differs; hence
the economic consequences and the rationale for reform are likely to
differ except in the general sense that such reform is expected to "im-
prove" performance in some sense. Precisely how it would improve per-
formance is necessarily a matter of the specifics involved.
12 Bailey & Malone, Resource Allocation and the Regulated Firm I BELL J. ECON.
& MA. Sci. 129 (1970).
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In short, just as there is no theory of regulation, there is no theory
of deregulation in the sense of explaining, in general, either when de-
regulation should or will occur or the extent to which it should or will
be carried out. Similarly, aside from general statements to the effect that
deregulation should be carried out so long as the benefits from deregu-
lation exceed the costs of deregulation, one need not lament the absence
of a meaningful theory of deregulation any more than one should lament
the lack of a theory of regulation. However, using public interest
criteria and emphasizing efficiency, as noted above, one can make judg-
ments concerning the consequences of present regulatory policies and
compare these with the probable consequences of various kinds of regu-
latory reform,. In many cases, the judgments will be firmly supported by
economic theory as well as by empirical evidence and experience else-
where. In some cases, however, the probabilities to be attached to the
consequences of reform will be very low and at best only informed
guesses.
What is required, of course, is an examination of the specific
regulatory constraints upon the many aspects of industrial behavior and
performance such as profits, prices, capital, mergers, operating authority,
entry, exit, and so on. A theory of deregulation, including how far to
proceed, would involve modifying those specific regulatory constraints
that impede efficiency, assuming this to be the overriding criterion, to
the point at which further modification would not yield benefits greater
than costs. If the specific constraints are interrelated, all of them may
need to be modified concurrently to achieve the preferred outcome. But
this is a "theory" only in the most trivial sense and provides no guidance
to those concerned with regulatory reform br deregulation.
Let me, therefore, take one of the regulated industries and examine
the case for deregulation along the lines suggested above, indicating the
extent to which deregulation should proceed, not necessarily the extent
to which it will proceed. I select transportation because regulatory reform
has been widely publicized and analyzed ever since President Kennedy's
transportation message to Congress on April 5, 1962, specific regulatory
reform bills have been submitted to Congress over the past five years
(with singular lack of success), and because that happens to be a field
in which I have frequently dabbled.
The general rationale underlying regulatory reform in transporta-
tion is that the costs of the present pattern of ICC regulation vastly ex-
ceed the perceived benefits. Beyond the vague feeling that "something
is wrong" in an industry subject to dramatic bankruptcies, enormous
1976]
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unused capacity, over-all unprofitability, deteriorating service, and rising
rates and fares, there is a belief that conditions within the surface land
freight transportation industry (rail and truck) have changed to such
an extent that the pattern of rail regulation established in 1887 and ex-
tended in 1935 to portions of trucking, is no longer relevant; indeed, it
may be largely responsible for some of the external manifestations of
malaise. While one can, and should, point to many things other than
regulation as being responsible for the economic and financial problems
of the transportation industry, it is clear that regulation as presently
practiced causes many distortions that invariably contribute to the present
conditions.
The specific ICC regulatory constraints that have adverse effects
are as follows:
(a) The Commission's cost-finding techniques designed to deter-
mine rate minima, on the assumption that rates below marginal costs
are "unjust," systematically overstate the costs for an efficient carrier
in particular markets. Carrier costs are likewise higher than they would
be in the absence of regulation because of the common carrier obligi-
tions.13
(b) The impact of Commission regulation on technological change
is adverse because of delays in permitting the rate reductions usually
associated with more efficient equipment (e.g., unit trains, Big John
hopper cars, etc.). This arises because of the Commission's reluctance
to permit injury to other regulated firms which may not adopt the in-
novation and to the desire not to disrupt the existing rate structure and
alter the existing market shares among transportation modes.
Technological change and efficient utilization of existing assets is
also retarded by the diversion of managerial talent from operating effi-
ciency towards the increasing complexities of complying with the regu-
latory and legal requirements. This inhibits much active searching for
efficiency-enhancing institutional changes or capital investments.
The reduction in competitive pressures that emerges from regula-
tion is believed to reduce efforts at improving efficiency and to contribute
to the "quiet life."
18 This refers to excess capacity costs due to the obligation to serve, and additional
costs related to filing of tariffs and schedules, regular reports to the ICC added insurance
requirements, higher tax liabilities for similar equipment, the expenses associated with
lengthy proceedings, and justification of proposed rate changes. Many of these costs
would be either non-existent or much lower in the absence of the present regulatory re-
quirements.
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(c) The ICC rate policy contributes to inefficiency by permitting
a narrower degree of rate differentiation than is justified by cost differ-
ences, by restricting peak/off-peak pricing as well as quantity discounts
even when justified by cost differences, and by permitting rate changes
at a much slower pace than cost changes. In general, rate regulation as
currently practiced systematically violates the economists' efficiency
criterion of having prices reflect costs or at least ensuring that price dif-
ferences reflect cost differences.
(d) Entry control designed to maintain the above rate pattern
itself leads to higher costs because of the route, back haul, and commodity
restrictions which augment excess capacity and the enormous costs of
proceedings with regard to new entrants in any sub-market.1 4
All of these consequences emerge from rather straightforward econ-
omic analysis. There are substantial analytical and empirical problems
associated with- each of them and the story is more complicated than
indicated above. But this illustrates the kind of analysis or theory needed
to derive the consequences of specific regulatory policies. The next step
is to attempt some quantification. That is, before tampering with a regu-
latory pattern that has persisted over a long period of time, one needs to
demonstrate that the consequences are significant. Not too many years
ago, economists were content with assertions to the effect that most or
all of the important transport sub-markets had become "workably com-
petitive" because of the rise of shipper alternatives largely due to the
expansion of the highway system and inland waterway improvements.
The shippers and communities remaining "captive prey" to the railways
appeared to be few in number. Thus, the argument went, assuming ICC
regulation was designed to protect the public and not the carriers, such
regulation was no longer necessary. Since the Commission is also con-
cerned with the preservation of common carriage (and apparently much
else besides !) and since it is difficult to demonstrate the "workability"
of competition, this' rationale for or theory of deregulation got short
shrift.
Subsequently, some economists turned their attention to estim4ing
the "social costs" of economic regulation of transport and to calculations
regarding the magnitude of waste or distortion caused by the above-
noted consequences. Excluding the impact upon technological change,
widely believed to be negative and substantial, the estimated costs appear
to be very large for surface transport alone: they amounted to over $4:
14 A more detailed analysis of the above is contained in Wilson, Regulatims Public
Policy, and Efficint Provision of Freight Transportation, 15 Tows. J. S (1975).
16 See p. -, supra.
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billion in 1975. I will refrain from commenting on the derivation of the
various estimates. Suffice it to say that most of them used acceptable
statistical techniques and propositions consistent with economic theory.
While one could obtain different magnitudes using different and equally
plausible assumptions and different data sets, the estimates appear to be
not unreasonable ball-park figures of the costs to society of present ICC
regulation.
The critical problem is to estimate the benefits and attempt to strike
a balance. Little work has yet been done in this area. For society as a
whole there may be some benefits from retaining a common carrier trans-
port system with its obligations to serve all at published rates without
discrimination. There may also be benefits to the economy of preserving
a higher degree of rate stability with regulation than without. However,
all other potential benefits are essentially transfer benefits from one group
to another. For example, the regulated carriers, the Teamsters' Union,
the railway operating brotherhoods, some communities and some small
shippers may, despite the problems noted above, be better off with
economic regulation than without. But such benefits are received from
shippers who pay higher rates than would otherwise be necessary, -from
consumers whose prices are higher because of this, and from taxpayers
who are called upon to subsidize various portions of the regulated trans-
port system either directly or indirectly. Such benefits are not net for
the economy as a whole and unless one is willing to argue that such
transfer beneficiaries should receive special treatment at the expense of
others, there is no net gain.
Thus the case for deregulation in transport rests on the belief that
the preservation of common- carriage, a higher degree of rate stability,
and the particular income redistributions noted above, are not "worth"
over $4 billion per year and ever greater amounts in the future.
At this point the argument, or theory, gets even fuzzier. Since the
consequences of deregulation have not been carefully assessed in terms
of which rates for which commodities in which regions will change,
either up or down, and by how much, the beneficial outcome rests on
the assumption that most transport markets are or would be workably
competitive. No one argues that real output of the economy will neces-
sarily rise by $4 billion were total deregulation to occur, since some de-
gree of excess capacity is necessary in transportation, since some of the
costs of litigation and proceedings would merely be shifted from the
ICC to the FTC or Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,
and since other aspects of public policy than economic regulation are
712 [Vol. 51.7r0
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involved in the "social costs" as estimated above. In addition, there would
or might be transition costs as firms adjust to newly granted freedom of
behavior. For the firms involved, especially in trucking, the value of
their operating authority would be sharply reduced, especially if greater
ease of entry to particular sub-markets were part of the deregulation
package and, in a sense, this would be tantamount to taking away some
property rights; thus the ATA vigorously fights all proposals. far de-
regulation. To what extent the costs of adjustment would reduce the net
benefits of deregulation is unknown. Offsetting these, however, is the
stimulus to technological innovation that would probably occur in a
workably competitive environment. This is an enormously complex issue
involving such things as the determinants of invention, innovation and
its diffusion, how regulatory constraints have influenced each, and how
each would respond to a reduction or elimination of such constraints.
The presumption is that the firms would be more technologically dynamic,
and that the delays in introducing a new technique would be shorter. If
so, this would increase the net benefits of deregulation.
Finally, the greater flexibility in pricing that would prevail under
deregulation would lead to different patterns of discrimination than now
exist (which may or may not be desirable), but this would provide a
partial alleviation of the problem of downward price inflexibility in the
economy as a whole which is widely believed to have contributed to the
stagflation dilemma facing the United States during the 1970's.
On grounds such as these, most economists would argue that the
specific ICC policies noted above should be relaxed and gradually elim-
inated over time. Thus we have some proposals and bills in Congress
that would, for example, permit rate changes within a certain range (plus
or minus seven percent) that would not be subject to ICC suspension or
approval, ease the restrictions upon abandonment of service and new
entry, require Commission action within a specified period of time
(shorter than the usual time involved), reduce the scope of the antitrust
immunity for rate bureaus, and so on. In general, the economists' ap-
proach involves greater reliance upon competitive forces and a reduction
in the extent of detailed economic regulation. There are honest differ-
ences of opinion concerning how far one should reduce the Commission's
authority on strictly economic grounds. There is, however, a strong be-
lief that many of the non-economic objectives held by the Commission
and used to justify uneconomic decisions can be accomplished by direct
policies that do not require higher transport costs. Unlike the 19th Cen-
tury, the Government now has tax and subsidy powers to alleviate any
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distress that might follow improved efficiency within transport by way
of railway abandonments of unprofitable track, higher rates to some
shippers and communities, and so on. In short, the use of a particular
industry to accomplish goals external to that industry imposes costs and
inefficiencies upon the industry so used. If such goals can be achieved
by cheaper and more direct means, then society as a whole is the loser
from continued regulation. In industries, such as transport, power, and
communications which provide such ubiquitous inputs into virtually all
productive processes, the inefficiencies caused or aggravated by regulatory
policies appear to be excessive-hence the call for regulatory reform.
Given the uncertainty regarding the specific effects of deregulation,
the approach to it has been to emphasize gradualness, largely to ease any
transition difficulties and to enable monitoring of the results before pro-
ceeding with further deregulation. However, those of us favoring some
degree of relaxation of regulatory restraints believe that this will confer
net economic benefits upon the American economy. Such a belief is con-
sistent with (a) economic analysis in general, as noted above, (b) ex-
perience within this country when the movement of certain agricultural
commodities was exempted from economic regulation, and (c) experi-
ence in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and Sweden when con-
straints of one form or another were lifted.
EcoNomic GUIDELINES FOR DEREGULATION
From the foregoing, one can sketch, not a theory, but a set of
guidelines to determine how far deregulation should proceed. Using
efficiency criteria, we should identify specific regulatory rules and prac-
tices whose effect is to raise costs of providing service and/or which
serve to impede technological change. We should then seek to quantify
such cost increases and compare these with some assessment of "benefits"
and the extent to which such benefits may be achieved by less costly tech-
niques, especially regarding those benefits external to the regulated in-
dustry itself. None of this will be easy nor, even when well done, free
from ambiguity. In addition, the necessity for gradualness, for extending
the area of discretionary behavior of the firms initially within relatively
narrow bounds for a fixed period of time during which the consequences
are carefully observed, is apparent.
This is not a philosophically appealing approach. It involves grubby,
microeconomic assessments and measurements commission by commis-
sion. Yet to obtain passage of enabling legislation, there is no alternative,
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especially where regulation has been in effect a long time, 6 where firms
and employee organizations have accommodated themselves rather fully
to it and where such firms and organizations have strong political influ-
ence. One must make a convincing case that regulatory reform in a par-
ticular direction will both improve industry efficiency and not wreak
significant harm on the various participants in or beneficiaries of existing
regulatory practices.
This is partly responsive to the last question posed for this col-
loquium: "Does the fact that there is an existing system of regulation
pose distinct problems ?" The answer clearly is in the affirmative. Regard-
less of which "theory" of regulation is believed relevant (the "protect
the public from monopolistic exploitation" or "protect the firms so regu-
lated from competitive pressures") or some combination of both,17 the
beginning of regulation is liable to be easier than is its reform or reduc-
tion. If the first theory is valid, the public is unlikely to be overly con-
cerned at the time regulation is enacted with causing economic loss to
previous exploiters and Congress is likely to view such loss as justified
retribution for previous excesses or ill-gotten gains. If the second theory
is relevant in particular instances, the general public is normally unable
to judge the merits of the case and Congress, in effect, has already
acquiesced. Not so in cases where, as noted above, regulation has been
in effect for many decades. Many of the firms now extant either grew
up with such regulation or have never known anything else. They have
organized their operations and created institutions in part to accom-
modate to the fact of regulatory restraint. Any change thus propels
firms into the unknown and raises the level of uncertainty, which will
be resisted by most of them. In addition, where regulation has conferred
certain property values upon the firms or where they have purchased such
rights to begin with, any significant change will reduce or even eliminate
such values.'" This not only raises issues of "due process," but will en-
hance the resistance to change, without adequate compensation, and, less
importantly, will lead to reduced tax revenues at all levels of government.
Furthermore, the firms and labor organizations which view them-
selves as beneficiaries can, and will, alarm third parties concerning the
consequences of deregulation. Thus the ATA and the Teamsters have
16 On the other hand, since regulation did not develop in this way, pressure groups
could be organized to push for deregulation in a way analogous to that in which pressure
groups led to regulation.
17Such as the quid pro quo version which "justifies" some protection of the firms in
exchange for accepting certain obligations to serve.
'
8 See Tullock, The Transacional Gains Trap, 6 BELL J. Ecoar. & MA. Scr. 671
(1975).
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been partially successful in erroneously raising the specter of serious
injury to small communities and small shippers if substantial relaxation
of rate and entry control occurs in the trucking industry. There is little
such third party input when initiating regulation, although this may be
changing with the growth of "public interest" law groups and associa-
tions.
As Professor Noll has pointed out, "Most regulatory issues are of
deep interest to regulated industries, with a very substantial amount of
income.., riding on the decision. The stake of the general public may in
the aggregate be even higher, but it is diffused among a large number
of unorganized individuals.... The motivation of a single firm to fight
an unfavorable regulatory decision is very high, while a regulatory deci-
sion unfavorable to the general public is unlikely to generate enough
interest to cause a general public interest to be raised." 9
Finally, there is enough uncertainty regarding the economic out-
come to give credence to many of the more unlikely consequences regu-
larly adduced by the parties immediately affected. Such allegations that
chaos would result, wages would fall, and the like, become part of the
rhetoric which all too often succeeds in restraining even the most modest
of regulatory reform proposals.
CONCLUSION
A theory of economic regulation or deregulation is probably not
especially useful and, depending upon what we expect of such a theory,
virtually impossible to develop except in a trivial or tautological sense.
I disagree, therefore, with the assertion that there is need for a theory
as to when and to what extent deregulation should be carried out. How-
ever, using efficiency criteria and employing a pragmatic (regulated)
industry by industry approach, one is able to identify particular aspects
or details or regulatory constraints that occasion costs and prices greater
than any reasonably identifiable benefits. Such constraints should be re-
laxed gradually or, in some instances, removed totally. If enough of
them are identified as being counterproductive in the efficiency sense, it
may then be desirable to eliminate commission-type regulation in that
industry altogether and leave the industry subject to the antitrust laws.
It is, of course, true that many of the reforms suggested in the
various deregulation measures do not require new legislation. Most,
if not all, could be implemented by the regulatory commissions them-
selves. In rate matters, for example, with no solid evidence regarding
19 R. NoLL, Rm OMING REGULATION 41 (1971).
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demand elasticities and with cost evidence relating to sales units subject
to enormous ambiguity, the decision whether to allow any given rate
change or portion thereof become essentially judgmental. Thus, a
commission could legitimately alter its judgments in these matters
to accomplish some of the results implicit in the reform proposals.
Similarly, with respect to entry controls, mergers, acquisitions, rate
flexibility, etc., the commissions' decisions, being largely judgmental
despite voluminous empirical evidence, could readily be made to comply
with most of the "reforms" being advocated. In short, legislative reform
would be unnecessary, given the wide latitude of commission authority
and the evidentiary problems noted above. However, commissions ap-
pear to suffer from enormous inertia in these matters for reasons rang-
ing from the desire for a "quiet life" to "sell out" to the industry so
regulated to a sincere belief that the existing policies are truly bene-
ficial to the economy, society, and polity as a whole. Perhaps this is why
commissions tend to take such a broad view of their mandate and down-
play efficiency criteria.
If so, this suggests not only the need for legislation to mandate
specific changes but for legislation that more carefully and more narrowly
specifies the objectives of regulation. Within the transportation indus-
tries, for example, I would strongly endorse legislation that restricts ICC
authority solely to matters of efficiency within the transport industry
itself.
Any negative effects regarding equity, regional imbalance, national
defense, particular ports, communities, and the like can be redressed
by more straightforward policies whose side effects appear to be less
unfavorable than continued malaise within transportation. I suspect that
the other regulatory commissions should be urged in one form or an-
other to give far greater weight to efficiency and technological change
(i.e., ultimately cheapness and plenty) than has hitherto been the case. In
the final analysis, from an economist's point of view, this is the basic
justification for deregulation.
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